Bank Stress Tests - What Took The Regulators So Long?
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner must be having a sense of deja vu when it comes to the stress tests that regulators are currently conducting on the 19 major banks in the U.S. Take a look at his speeches as New York Fed president from early 2005 onwards and one can't help but wonder why regulators didn't act earlier to rein in the banking sector.
Geithner didn't hold many speeches as Fed president, but when he did, from 2005 onwards, he was constantly - a bit like a Greek chorus - urging financial institutions to make sure their stress tests were based on sufficiently negative parameters (the tail risk) and that the tests were conducted across all asset classes, not just on a business by business line (contagion risk). Capital and liquidity cushions - he said time and again - should be appropriate to the most negative outcomes ("adverse scenarios where uncertainty is the highest") rather than just meet minimal regulatory standards. One presumes that if he said it publicly, he was saying something similar in private, both to his fellow regulators and the firms he oversaw.
Roll forward to 2009 and his recommendations four years ago look very much like the blue print for the Federal Reserve's stress tests - and while there's little point now in bashing the regulators - who clearly saw cause for concern even when the good times were still rolling in the credit markets - we should learn the lessons of the past and remember that leaving it to the banks, or any group of private sector agents (same would be true for energy companies or health insurers) to self-regulate and do the right thing out of enlightened self interest and an obligation to their shareholders is foolhardy and invites abuse.
There's no telling what would have happened had the Fed forced the banks in 2005 or 2006 to raise capital and liquidity cushions significantly above the regulatory requirements and conduct far more stringent stress tests. The investment banks would have remained outside this net, unless the SEC had joined in, so Bear Stearns and Lehman might still have gone under. But humans are by nature prone not to do what's best for them and easily swayed by short-term considerations. Which is why we have civil laws and which is also why regulators and politicians should not shirk their duty and institute tough rules for industries that have the power to sink our economy.
Geithner didn't hold many speeches as Fed president, but when he did, from 2005 onwards, he was constantly - a bit like a Greek chorus - urging financial institutions to make sure their stress tests were based on sufficiently negative parameters (the tail risk) and that the tests were conducted across all asset classes, not just on a business by business line (contagion risk). Capital and liquidity cushions - he said time and again - should be appropriate to the most negative outcomes ("adverse scenarios where uncertainty is the highest") rather than just meet minimal regulatory standards. One presumes that if he said it publicly, he was saying something similar in private, both to his fellow regulators and the firms he oversaw.
Roll forward to 2009 and his recommendations four years ago look very much like the blue print for the Federal Reserve's stress tests - and while there's little point now in bashing the regulators - who clearly saw cause for concern even when the good times were still rolling in the credit markets - we should learn the lessons of the past and remember that leaving it to the banks, or any group of private sector agents (same would be true for energy companies or health insurers) to self-regulate and do the right thing out of enlightened self interest and an obligation to their shareholders is foolhardy and invites abuse.
There's no telling what would have happened had the Fed forced the banks in 2005 or 2006 to raise capital and liquidity cushions significantly above the regulatory requirements and conduct far more stringent stress tests. The investment banks would have remained outside this net, unless the SEC had joined in, so Bear Stearns and Lehman might still have gone under. But humans are by nature prone not to do what's best for them and easily swayed by short-term considerations. Which is why we have civil laws and which is also why regulators and politicians should not shirk their duty and institute tough rules for industries that have the power to sink our economy.
Labels: bank stress tests, corporate defaults, credit crunch, economic recovery, Federal Reserve, financial stability, markets, timothy geitner, treasury white paper
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